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The law and the administration of justice should be the primary forces in
combating the causes and effects of racism. Yet justice systems all too often
fail in this purpose and instead mirror the prejudices of the society they
serve. The problem is therefore twofold: it is vital that we work towards
ensuring that every justice system has procedures and safeguards to prevent
discrimination, including laws that prohibit and punish discrimination, and
mechanisms to check and rectify patterns of discrimination. It is also neces-
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sary to ensure that discriminatory mechanisms and practices in the systems
of the administration of justice themselves are eliminated.
1

Sergio Vieira de Mello

I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to other rights covered by the civil rights movement, the
right to be free from disproportionate impact of environmental decisionmaking, or environmental justice, is a late comer to the civil rights vocabulary. The movement came to national attention in 1982, after protests
against the siting of a PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls) landfill in a predominantly African-American community in Warren County led to hun2
dreds of arrests. As a result of the protests, the U.S. General Accounting
3
Office (GAO) held an investigation and published a report, which in turn
triggered a comprehensive national study directed by the United Church of
4
Christ Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ) looking into demographic
patterns associated with the location of hazardous waste sites. The study
concluded that the relationship between race and the location of hazardous
5
waste facilities was stronger than any other relationship, including income.
A second study conducted by the National Law Journal confirmed the findings of the CRJ study, and also found that the harmful effect of the disproportionate siting was compounded by the differential application of en6
forcement and remediation measures.
Environmental justice is considered a civil right, which is violated by
environmental inequity. Environmental inequity is the actual or potential
exposure of poor or minority communities to a disproportionate share of

1
Sergio Vieira de Mello, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 62d Sess. (March 21, 2003),
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/BFFF5C61BD1195C5C1256CE00048C2C1?opend
ocument (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
2
See, e.g., Audrey Wright, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Reviewing the
Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1725, 1728 (1993).
3
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, GAO- RCED83-168 (1983), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf.
4
BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS & CHARLES LEE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
5
Id. See also Neil Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights
and State Constitutions. 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 342 (1996).
6
See Popovic, supra note 5, at 343.
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7

environmental risk. Environmental racism has also been defined as a
8
“breach of the human rights norm against discrimination.” Since the beginning of the environmental justice movement, the effectiveness of civil
rights legislation in addressing environmental inequities has been severely
9
curtailed. Part II of this paper presents a brief history of the development
of civil rights jurisprudence and its decreasing usefulness in dealing with
environmental justice issues. Part III evaluates whether recent case law can
validate some of the proposed alternative litigation approaches to reliance
on civil rights legislation in environmental justice cases. Part IV examines
the alternative of legislative reform, and Part V discusses international environmental laws and whether they can help alleviate some of the problems
faced by environmental justice plaintiffs in United States courts.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLAIMS BASED ON
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The most appropriate jurisprudential framework for claims alleging
disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards is generally found in
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution. Equality jurisprudence created the framework that has been
used to address inequality and prevent racially discriminatory actions in
education, voting, housing, and employment contexts. The same framework
10
should be appropriate for dealing with environmental racism.
Civil rights law has been described as a rights-maximizing approach to
11
solving conflicts, as opposed to an interest-balancing approach. In the
rights-maximizing approach of civil rights laws, a finding that a violation of
a legally recognized right has occurred leads to attempts to vindicate the
right, regardless of the cost to the wrongdoer or others. In contrast, environmental laws are seen as an “interest-balancing approach to resolving

7
Rodolfo Mata, Environmental Equity: The Next Generation of Facility Siting Programs, 16
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1995). See also Melissa A. Hoffer, Closing the Door on Private Enforcement of Title VI and EPA’s Discriminatory Effects Regulations: Strategies for Environmental Justice
Stakeholders After Sandoval and Gonzaga, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 971, 974-75 (2004).
8
See Popovic, supra note 5, at 352.
9
In the early and mid-1990s, many scholars were already expressing doubts about the effectiveness of Equal Protection and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in the struggle for environmental justice
because of the high burden posed by the intent requirement. See Popovic, supra note 5, at 345.
10 See generally Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination. 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992).
11 Tseming Yang, Environmental Justice: Mobilizing for the 21st Century: Balancing Interests
and Maximizing Results in Environmental Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 529, 532 (1999). Yang’s use of the
rights-maximizing versus interest-balancing views is based on Paul Gewirtz’s distinction used in the
context of school desegregation litigation. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J.
585, 588-89 (1983).
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12

conflicts.” In an interest-balancing context, the decision makers consider
factors such as economic costs and benefits, technological feasibility, or the
13
reasonableness of the measure. Under an interest-balancing approach,
there is always the possibility that another interest may justify the violation
14
of the right. From the point of view of available remedies, there is a clear
advantage to the remedies offered under the civil rights approach over
remedies offered under an interest-balancing approach. However, the intent
requirement under Equal Protection and Title VI legislation poses huge
obstacles for those attempting to fight environmental injustice under a civil
rights approach.
A. The Intent Requirement in Equal Protection and Title VI
By the time environmental justice claims attempted to use equality jurisprudence, certain restrictions in the application of the Equal Protection
Clause had already been put in place, severely limiting plaintiffs’ chances
of success. The first significant restriction was created by Washington v.
15
Davis, where the Supreme Court held that in causes of action alleging
violation of an Equal Protection Clause, proof of discriminatory intent was
required. Evidence of discriminatory impact alone, the Court said, without
proof of discriminatory purpose, is insufficient to establish a violation of
the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments. In Washington v. Davis, the plaintiffs
complained that the use of a test for hiring decisions had a disparate impact
by race, excluding a disproportionate numbers of minorities from employment. The plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis did not state a claim under Title
VII standards because, at the time the claim was filed, Title VII had not
16
been extended to reach government employees.
In dicta, however, the Court admitted that under Title VII Congress
had eliminated the requirement that plaintiffs prove the existence of discriminatory intent when hiring and promotion practices disqualified a dis17
proportionate number of black candidates. The Court acknowledged that
under Title VII it would be necessary for the defendants to actually validate
the use of the test by demonstrating that it was a valid predictor of job performance, but refused to apply this “rigorous” standard to the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendment analysis. The Court arrived at this disposition by
relying on the principle that, on its own, the disparate impact of state action

12
13
14
15
16
17

Yang, supra note 11, at 532.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239, n.2.
Id. at 247.
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did not constitute intentional discrimination. The Court resurrected this
principle from some cases dating back over 100 years relating to jury selection and the exclusion of minorities from certain final juries. The Davis
Court did not see any problems with applying the principle in the context of
the standardized testing for purposes of employment, despite the obvious
differences between the process of selecting a specific jury from a jury pool
19
and the decision to use a test for purposes of decision-making in hiring.
Between the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
difficulties inherent in proving the intent to discriminate, suggesting that
statistical evidence of disproportionate impact was neither irrelevant nor
“the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
20
Constitution.” Evidence of disparate impact was one of the factors that,
viewed in the totality of all relevant factors, permitted an inference of invidious discriminatory purpose from circumstantial evidence. The Court
refused to adopt a per se rule that a law that is “neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater
21
proportion of one race than of another.” Under Washington v. Davis, however, although disparate impact on its own could not serve as a proxy for
intent, it could be used as a starting point for an analysis of whether discriminatory intent was present, particularly if the policy could not be justified as serving other legitimate purposes. Thus, evidence of disparate impact served to shift the burden to the government. Through the years, however, this approach has gradually evolved and morphed into something
quite different from what was suggested in Washington v. Davis.
A few months after Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court decided
22
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
a case where a non-profit organization alleged that the Board’s denial of a
re-zoning to allow for building of low and middle income racially integrated housing was racially motivated. The Court acknowledged the difficulties associated with establishing discriminatory intent, and supported the
idea that invidious discriminatory purpose can be inferred when a “clear

18

Id.
The main difference between choice of a culturally-biased test and bias in jury selection is that
the jury is selected each time by different individuals, and intent would have to be individually attributed to each court in each case where a racially-biased jury results. In contrast, in the biased-test context, there is only one actor, the decision making agency, which chooses to use a test that continuously
produces biased results each time. The test is designed by specialists who could, if so required, design a
test that is not biased. Thus, the analogy between the jury selection context and the biased test context is
inapposite. It would make perfect sense to infer intent to discriminate when an agency chooses to use a
test knowing that such test has been shown to continuously produce racially-biased results.
20 426 U.S. at 242.
21 Id.
22 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
19
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pattern, unexplained on grounds other than race” appears even though the
23
legislation appears to be “neutral on its face.” When no such clear pattern
24
exists, “the Court must look to other evidence.”
In Arlington Heights, the Court expanded on the factors to be examined in order to infer discriminatory intent that the Court had alluded to in
Washington v. Davis. The Arlington Heights Court suggested a nonexhaustive list of five factors: the discriminatory impact; the historical
background of the decision; the specific sequence of events leading to the
challenged decision; departures from the normal procedure sequence; and
the legislative or administrative history. Despite finding that some opponents to the project who spoke at various Board hearings might have been
motivated by opposition to minority groups, and that the buffer policy used
by the village as the main reason for refusing the building permit had not
been uniformly enforced, the Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to
carry their burden of proof.
In fact, despite the list from Arlington Heights and the admission that
sometimes the disparate impact is sufficient to establish intent, the current
burden of proof for showing discriminatory intent could be described as
requiring a “smoking gun.” The level of proof required is illustrated by
25
Miller v. City of Dallas, one of the rare cases where plaintiffs were successful in alleging discriminatory intent. The case was settled for an undisclosed amount once the court dismissed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of fact concerning whether the city
26
of Dallas intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs. In Miller, the
evidence included a long and documented history that designated the
neighborhood in question as a “Negro district” in the 1940s, followed by
the construction of a levee project where the city was aware that it was not
only excluding minority neighborhoods but the project would increase
flooding problems in those neighborhoods. In addition to the refusal to provide adequate flood protection, the city had also refused to enforce laws
regulating pollution in minority neighborhoods while enforcing the same
regulations in white neighborhoods. In sum, the Miller decision indicates
that “[a]bsent a history of racial segregation and documented government
policy promoting discriminatory practices—both typically rare in environmental justice cases—claims of intentional discrimination will not suc27
28
ceed.” The Court chose to use the Yick Wo standard as a threshold. In

23
24
25

Id. at 266.
Id.
Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2341 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14,

2002).
26
27
28

See Hoffer, supra note 7, at 980.
Id. at 984.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Yick Wo, no Chinese person was granted a license to operate a laundry from
the permitting agency, while no white person was denied a license, in a
29
situation where there was a perfect correlation between race and denial of
a privilege. There, the court found that the disparate impact alone was an
indicator of intent. The Miller Court’s choice of Yick Wo’s perfect correlation standard as the minimum for a showing of discriminatory intent created
an extremely high, impossible-to-satisfy standard for finding intentional
30
discrimination.
The intent requirement for equal protection claims is a judicial crea31
tion. The Supreme Court’s justification for the intent requirement was
based neither on the plain language of the Equal Protection Clause, nor on
legislative intent, nor even on any serious public policy argument. The
32
reasoning behind the intent requirement was based on expediency: the
Court worried that a rule requiring compelling justification for a statute that
had a discriminatory impact despite being facially neutral might “perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that my be more burdensome to the poor and to the aver33
The development of the inage black than to the more affluent white.”
tent requirement is a clear example of the creation of discriminatory
mechanisms and practices within the system of the administration of jus34
tice. In the case of the dominant interpretations of the intent requirement,
these discriminatory mechanisms and practices completely undermine statutes proscribing racial discrimination.
B. Claims of Disparate Impact Under Section 602 of Title VI
In light of the continuously growing burden posed by the intent requirement, plaintiffs attempting to enjoin state or federal actions resulting
in discriminatory environmental impacts turned to § 602 of Title VI. Section 602 prohibits funding recipients from action that has a discriminatory
impact regardless of intent and, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Alex35
ander v. Sandoval, was interpreted by courts as creating an implied right

29 A perfect correlation is one where the two variables correlate one hundred percent of the time,
as was the case in Yick Wo. Perfect correlations are rarely or never found in the social world.
30 Uma Outka, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV. 209, 243
(2005).
31 Id. at 242. The language of the Equal Protection Clause does not allocate the “equal protection
of the laws” based on whether a discernable motive can explain the denial. Id. Prior to Washington v.
Davis, the Supreme Court had ruled that a showing of disproportionate impact could shift the burden to
the government, to justify the challenged measure. Id. (citing a Title VII employment discrimination
case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
32 Id.
33 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
34 See Vieira de Mello, supra note 1.
35 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).

262

FIU Law Review

[4:255

of action. This tradition of implying a right of action under Title VI dates
36
from Lau v. Nichols, a case involving Chinese children who had been refused English instruction in public schools. In Lau, the court found a violation of Health, Education and Welfare Department (HEW) regulations that
stated:
[D]iscrimination is barred which has that effect even though no purposeful design is present: a recipient “may not . . . utilize criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination” or have “the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the program
37
as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.”
Even though there was no evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court
38
found for the plaintiff, implying a right of action under § 602. If the
courts continued to rely on the principle used in Lau when examining
claims brought under environmental regulations created in response to §
602 of Title VI, plaintiffs would be able to avoid the high burden created by
the increasingly stricter application-of-intent requirement.
In the thirty years since the Lau decision, however, the Supreme Court
has gradually moved away from allowing plaintiffs a right of action under §
39
602. This move culminated with the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval.
That decision made official what Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
40
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York hinted at
twenty years earlier. Justice O’Connor characterized the Court’s ruling in
Guardians as in effect overruling Lau’s approval of liability for conduct
having a discriminatory impact in the absence of a showing of discrimina41
tory intent. Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that although § 601 may be
read as requiring proof of discriminatory intent in the same measure as the
Equal Protection Clauses were in Washington v. Davis, it specifically permitted administrative regulations proscribing discriminatory impact, and
therefore these were valid regulations that created a right of action on their
42
own. In Guardians, such regulations existed, they followed the language
suggested by the Justice Department, and they prohibited “criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
43
discrimination.” The Supreme Court, in denying a right of action under

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Lau v. Nicols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 567.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 617-18. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 618 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964)).
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regulations created under § 602, has ignored its own standards regarding
44
deference to reasonable administrative construction of statutes.
In Sandoval, a case involving an English-only policy for driver’s licenses exams in Alabama, the Court found that § 602 did not include the
“rights creating” language required for private right of action. For a short
period after Sandoval, it appeared that plaintiffs interested in pursuing an
environmental justice claim based on disparate impact could still rely on 42
45
U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain a right of action. Circuit courts were split on the
46
issue, with some finding that § 1983 provided such a right of action while
47
other circuits disagreed.
Even in the circuits where the § 1983 approach was successful, however, the option did not remain available for long. A year after Sandoval, the
48
Court’s opinion in Gonzaga University v. Doe indicated that § 1983 also
did not create a right of action to enforce provisions created in response to
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Although
not exactly a ruling on § 602 of Title VI, the Court specifically cited Title
49
VI legislation as the kind of regulation affected by the decision, thus fore50
closing the alternative of using § 1983 to enforce § 602 regulations.
The seemingly insurmountable obstacles posed by the intent requirement under Equal Protection Clause and § 601 of Title VI, and the denial of
a right of action under either section 602 of Title VI or 42 U.S.C. 1983,
have pushed advocates into a search for alternative options, either through
litigation or other means.

44 See David Galalis, Environmental Justice Under Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval:
Disparate Impact Regulations Still Valid under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61 (2004). Galalis notes that, despite Sandoval, EPA regulations promulgated under § 602 remain valid law standing on
their own under a Chevron analysis, which the Supreme Court never conducted. Galalis conducts a twostep analysis of § 602 under Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S 837 (1984), and concludes that the language of
the statute is ambiguous, and the legislative history indicates that “Congress intentionally placed the
resolution of the scope of Title VI in agency hands, to be determined according to the needs of the
program administered by each agency.” Galalis, Environmental Justice, at 95-96. See also, Hoffer,
supra note 7, at 997.
45 See Hoffer, supra note 7, at 992.
46 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v.
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d at 548 (6th Cir. 1994) and holding that the rule from Loschiavo that a federal
regulation alone may create a right enforceable under §1983 is no longer viable); Powell v. Ridge, 189
F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999). However, Powell was questioned by later cases based on the Alexander v.
Sandoval decision. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *32 (D. Pa.
January 29, 2002) (concluding that, in light of Sandoval, the reasoning that satisfied their test to recognize a private cause of action for discrimination in Powell no longer applies).
47 See, e.g., Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir.
1987).
48 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
49 Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284, n.3.
50 See, e.g., Hoffer, supra note 7, at 998.
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C. The Future of Environmental Claims under Civil Rights Legislation
In theory, the principle that statistical evidence alone may be sufficient
51
to establish a discriminatory intent is well established. In practice, however, the Supreme Court has held evidence of disparate impact as sufficient
52
to infer discriminatory intent only twice. Generally, federal courts have
inferred discriminatory intent from discriminatory impact data in only three
53
cases. All three of these cases dealt with wrongful misallocation of mu54
nicipal services. In all five cases, the government was not able to show
55
any rational purpose for the discriminatory impact caused by their action.
Cases dealing with the siting of hazardous facilities, or other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs), are different from cases dealing with the allocation of resources, because the number of existing facilities is not amenable
56
to producing the same kind of clear-cut statistical data. In addition, siting
decisions involve more complex, multi-factor decisions. Additionally, the
remedy for inadequate allocation of resources is a court order to provide
equal services, while the remedy for siting decisions involves finding an
alternative location, merely “push[ing] the problem onto another commu57
nity.”
The problem of when evidence of impact can be used as evidence of
58
intent might be improved by better statistical data in litigation. Data on
discriminatory impact that better controls for alternative explanations for
59
the impact, such as market forces, may help change the way courts view
evidence of impact.
Another option for litigants is making an argument based on the con60
cept of “aversive racism.” Aversive racism refers to the unconscious use
of racist attitudes acquired early on in life in information processing and
61
decision making. The aversive racism argument is based on critical race
51

See, e.g., Bean v. Southwest Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
Sean-Patrick Wilson, Fighting the Good Fight: The Role of Environmental Civil Rights Litigators Going Forward and the Need for a Continuance of the Litigation Tool in the Environmental Justice
Movement, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 305 (2006). The two cases are Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
53 Id. at 306. The three cases are: Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1986);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 1983); and Baker v. Kissimmee, 645 F.
Supp. 571, 585-86 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 306-07.
56 Id. at 309.
57 Id. at 308.
58 Id. at 310.
59 Id.
60 See Edward Patrick Boyle, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV.
937 (1993).
61 Id. at 939. See also Barbara Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See:” White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987-89 (1993).
52
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theory; as summarized by Edward Patrick Boyle, it stands for the proposition that “unmanifested unconscious racist feelings do not go away when
rejected; rather, they are reformulated, disguised, and adorned with trappings of logic and reason, in order to survive the scrutiny of the conscious
62
mind.” The aversive theory argument is supported by empirical data,
which, to date, strongly supports the idea that no decision is, in fact, racially
63
neutral, and that a court’s presumption that race-neutrality exists when the
decision-maker is aware of the disparate impact at the time of the decision
making is, in and of itself, evidence of aversive racism. In failing to recognize the racism underneath the “facially neutral” decision, the court is engaging in exactly the same denial mechanisms as those used by the decision-makers. Bringing strong empirical evidence of how racism manifests
itself in these non-obvious ways at the governmental decision-making level
may help persuade a court to give more weight to evidence of disparate
impact.
III. ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION APPROACHES TO CIVIL
RIGHTS BASED LITIGATION
A. Deliberate Indifference Theory
The use of deliberate indifference theory is not truly an alternative to
litigation under civil rights laws; it is actually a strategy used to overcome
the extremely high burden of showing discriminatory intent under the Su64
preme Court’s doctrinal approach to the Equal Protection Clause. In Geb65
ser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Supreme Court recognized a “deliberate indifference” standard that makes a federally funded
entity liable for gender discrimination under Title IX. Deliberate indifference can be found when an official in a federally funded program or activity
and who has the authority to address the alleged discrimination and institute
corrective measures, has actual or constructive knowledge of the discrimi66
natory conduct, but fails to respond adequately. In a later case, the Court

62

Boyle, supra note 60, at 944.
Id. at 939-51 (describing how racism in America has, for political and economic reasons,
shifted to an aversive mode).
64 See Brian Faerstein, Resurrecting Equal Protection Challenges to Environmental Inequity: A
Deliberately Indifferent Optimistic Approach, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 564 (2004). See also Derek
Black, Picking up the Pieces After Alexander and Sandoval: Ressurrecting a Private Cause of Action for
Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356 (2002) (examining the use of deliberate indifferent theory in
Title VI claims in the education context).
65 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding that when sufficient proof
of actual or constructive notice of the harassment exist, the school district can be found liable for damages under Title IX, under a deliberate indifference theory, for failure to adequately investigate a female
student’s allegations of sexual harassment by a teacher).
66 Id. at 290.
63
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further clarified the doctrine of deliberate indifference by explaining that
the funding recipient’s liability arises out of its failure to remedy the discriminatory problem when it has control over the discriminatory conduct
67
and is on notice of the problem.
Some courts have viewed satisfaction of the deliberate indifference
standard as sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent for claims brought
68
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Attempts to use the
standard under Title VI, however, have proven unsuccessful, both in an
educational context and in the environmental justice context. In Pryor v.
69
NCAA, the Third Circuit refused to apply the deliberate indifference theory to a Title VI purposeful discrimination case. In Pryor, plaintiffs opposed the NCAA’s adoption of a policy increasing academic requirements
for freshman athletes’ scholarships, which resulted in disparate impact for
70
black student athletes. Plaintiffs in Pryor alleged that the NCAA was deliberately indifferent to the disparate impact on black students, and that
indifference, in light of the NCAA’s knowledge of the disparate impact,
71
amounted to discriminatory intent under Title VI. The Third Circuit distinguished between the omissions committed in the deliberate indifference
cases under Title IX and the policy targeted by plaintiffs under Title VI, and
refused to “conflate” the deliberate indifference test with purposeful dis72
crimination, finding the purposeful discrimination requirement from
Sandoval to be stricter than a showing that the recipient was deliberately
73
indifferent to the discriminatory impact of a facially neutral policy.
The Third Circuit’s decision in Pryor indicates that deliberate indifference can not succeed as an independent theory that can substitute for a
74
showing of intentional discrimination under Title VI claims. It did not,
however, rule out the utilization of the theory as “an evidentiary piece of a
75
larger puzzle.” The court also noted that under Title IX, the theory is generally used in claims for damages, while Title VI actions in environmental
76
justice more often seek injunctive relief.
67 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding a school district liable
under the deliberate indifference theory for violation of Title IX requirements for failure to adequately
respond to student-on-student harassment when the principal and several teachers were aware of the
sexual harassment occurring in the school).
68 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). Title IX prohibits federally funded program from discriminating on
the basis of sex. The statute is modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and has been interpreted by
courts as being parallel to it. See also Faerstein, supra note 64, at 579.
69 Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002).
70 Id. at 552.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 569.
73 Id.
74 Faerstein, supra note 64, at 581.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 582.
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An attempt to utilize the theory of deliberate indifference as a piece of
the puzzle to show discriminatory intent in an environmental justice case
however, has not proven successful. The most recent decision in the South
77
Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Enviromental Protection case
is illustrative of the obstacles facing environmental justice plaintiffs in
post–Sandoval jurisprudence. The case had initially been decided by the
District Court a few days before Sandoval, where the judge had concluded
that the “New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
and Commissioner Shinn [had] violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by
failing to consider the potential adverse, disparate impact of the SLC facility’s operation on individuals based on their race, color, or national origin,
78
as part of the NJDEP’s decision to permit SLC’s proposed facility.” Implicit in that initial decision was the idea that plaintiffs had a right of action
under section 602 of Title VI.
After the Sandoval decision denying a right of action under section
602, the case was remanded to the District Court to determine inter alia,
whether there was evidence of discriminatory intent that could constitute a
violation of section 601. The Court followed Pryor in finding that “delib79
erate indifference is not enough to justify relief under Title VI,” and also
in rejecting the notion that the disregard shown by defendants towards
plaintiffs’ rights might constitute a piece of evidence that in combination
with other evidence, could support a finding of intentional discrimination.
Plaintiffs in South Camden had argued that the NJDEP had deliberately
ignored several indicators of disparate impact that had been specifically
pointed to the Department; that it had chosen not to implement newer,
stricter air quality standards despite evidence that the older standards had
been shown to not provide sufficient protection; and that it had also failed
to enforce regulations when the permittee violated the conditions of the
permit.
The South Camden plaintiffs also showed that the state had just created the Advisory Council on Environmental Equity. The Council was
charged with establishing “a permanent source of advice and counsel in
recognition of state and federal concerns that minority and low-income
populations may be experiencing a greater impact from pollution than other
communities,” and with "making recommendations to the Commissioner
for strategies to promote environmental equity in New Jersey and for building partnerships and trust with [the] many diverse communities within

77 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 01-702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45765 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
78 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 481 (D.N.J.
2001).
79 S. Camden, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45765, at *69.
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80

[New Jersey].” Furthermore, the Advisory Council was “to provide assistance during the implementation of [the] Environmental Equity policy and
thereafter serve as [NJDEP’s] principal advisory resource” for handling
environmental equity concerns. One result of the establishment of the
Council was the development of a screening model to test the hypothesis
that “there was a difference in level of exposures to environmental hazards
81
and air pollutants among different ethnic groups in New Jersey.” The
model would allegedly be incorporated into NJDEP’s equity policy. The
expert who developed the model testified that statewide, minorities had
more than the average exposure to pollutants than whites. Plaintiffs in South
Camden also argued that new standards for air quality had been promulgated by the EPA in 1999, but were not implemented because they were
being litigated. However, the existence of the new standards should have
been considered as putting the DEP on notice that the previous standards
did not adequately protect the affected population.
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs in South Camden had evidence of
the deliberate indifference of the agency towards its own goals of addressing environmental equity issues, the Court granted summary judgment to
defendants. The court allegedly conducted an analysis under the Arlington
Heights standards and dismissed each one of the plaintiffs’ arguments by
finding that “even assuming that plaintiffs’ [arguments] were accurate” each
one of them individually did not amount to evidence of discriminatory intent. The court, however, never addressed the question of whether all the
evidence presented by plaintiffs combined, if accurate, could amount to
evidence of discriminatory intent. The decision in South Camden seems to
indicate that there is no limit to how heavy the burden of proving discriminatory intent can be. In the thirty years since Washington v. Davis’ intent
requirement, the burden on plaintiffs in the environmental justice context
82
has become virtually insurmountable, negating the impact of both the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.
One post-Sandoval case may have given some hope to proponents of
deliberate indifference theory as a useful tool in overcoming the intent requirement. In Cooley v. Pennsylvania DEP, the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board denied a motion to dismiss a case alleging a section
601 violation based on allegations that the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection had failed to investigate whether the project, a
waste-to-energy facility in Harrisburg, would have a disparate impact, despite being required to conduct such investigation. The Board’s opinion
suggested that the issuing of a permit without any investigation as to possi80

New Jersey Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., Administrative Order 1998-15.
S. Camden, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45765, at *25.
82 Rachel Paras, Relief at the End of the Winding Road: Using Third Party Beneficiary Rule and
Alternative Avenues to Achieve Environmental Justice, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 157 (2003).
81
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ble disparate impacts may constitute evidence of intentional discrimination
83
Unfortunately, the Board later granted summary
by the department.
judgment for the defendants based on a procedural issue, without address84
ing the merits of the intentional discrimination claim. Although the
Board’s initial opinion on the case did not mention deliberate indifference,
the opinion hinted at the possibility of a theory of intentional discrimination
based on a deliberate failure to follow required procedures intended to prevent disparate impact:
The allegation that the Department issued the permit without making
any investigation regarding the Civil Rights Act can be taken, and we
do so take it for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, as an allegation
that the Department’s failure to perform the investigation was intentional and that intentional racial discrimination motivated the declina85
tion to perform any investigation.
Neither the plaintiffs nor the Board in the Cooley case mentioned deliberate
indifference, but the opinion seems to rely on a similar concept as that used
by proponents of deliberate indifference.
Although the Supreme Court’s use of the Arlington Heights factors
seemed to indicate that discriminatory intent could be proven by circumstantial evidence, more recent cases like South Camden III point to the contrary. The Third Circuit’s decision in South Camden as well as the Pennsylvania Board’s in Cooley dampen the hopes of success for approaches
based on circumstantial evidence of intent, such as deliberate indifference,
in the Title VI environmental justice context.
B. Use of State Constitution and Environmental Laws
1. NEPA and SEPAs
86

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not prohibit racially disparate impacts per se; the Act requires only the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement for any “major Federal Action signifi87
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Because NEPA
does not impose any substantive requirements regardless of the existence of
adverse impacts of government action, its ability to reduce disparate im83 Cooley v. Pennsylvania Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 2004 E.H.B. 554 (2004). Opinion and Order
Granting Joint Motion for Summary Judgment issued September 15, 2005, available at
http://ehb.courtapps.com/corpus/ 50050252003246.pdf (the Board ruled in favor of defendants based on
the fact that the authority had submitted a second plan, which the DEP had explicitly defined as a new
application, thus rendering the complaint regarding the first application submitted by plaintiffs moot).
84 Id.
85 Cooley, 2004 E.H.B., at 26.
86 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370.
87 Id.
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pacts is limited. Nevertheless, even the strictly procedural requirements of
NEPA can be useful for communities attempting to prevent the siting of
hazardous facilities or other major projects that may unfairly increase environmental risks for a community. NEPA contains provisions for public
participation that can be useful in empowering communities by providing a
forum for communities to educate the government on the disparate impacts
88
that proposed actions may have on the communities. Communities can
use the opportunity for organization and public involvement in decision
89
making. Specifically in the environmental justice context, the Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation of “environmental impact” as including health
90
impacts caused by changes to the physical environment indicates that
NEPA environmental impact statements should also be required to include
secondary health effects and other socio-economic impacts at the environ91
mental assessment stage.
In addition to NEPA, individual states have their own policy acts (col92
lectively referred to as SEPAs by commentators), which may require consideration of a broader scope of impacts than NEPA. Some SEPAs even go
93
as far as requiring consideration of environmental justice issues; others
94
impose substantive requirements on state or local decision-makers. Even
the most demanding SEPA’s, however, are limited by the fact that they apply only to state or local action, and not to federal actions resulting in dispa95
rate impact. Despite these limitations, SEPAs have been found to be use96
ful for communities struggling against proposed noxious land uses.
One important limitation of NEPA’s application in environmental justice cases is that due to the statute’s language, many actions by the federal
government are not subject to NEPA’s review procedures. The permitting
of hazardous waste facilities, an action that often results in disparate impacts, has been excluded from NEPA requirements because the Eleventh
Circuit found that the EPA’s process for issuing the permit was a “func-

88 See Stephen Johnson, NEPA and SEPAs in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 565, 571 (1997).
89 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Community Initiatives: Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and
Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 687 (1995) (suggesting that one way to affect the decision making process is to use the reporting requirement to get an
organized community to run a campaign around an environmental impact report, educate itself about the
project and mount an organized campaign to oppose the project).
90 See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
91 See Johnson, supra note 88, at 584.
92 Id. at 566 n.6.
93 Id. at 567-68.
94 Id. at 597-98.
95 Id. at 568.
96 Cole, supra note 89, at 690.
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97

tional equivalent” of NEPA review requirements. The court ignored significant differences between NEPA requirements and the requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike NEPA,
RCRA requires neither consideration of socio-economic impacts nor con98
sideration of alternatives to issuing the permit. Furthermore, RCRA public
99
participation requirements are not as extensive as those under NEPA.
Similar exemptions on the basis of “functional equivalency” are used when
the EPA or other government agencies establish environmental standards,
even though the process by which the environmental standards are created
is substantially different from an environmental impact statement under
100
NEPA.
Yet another limitation of NEPA as a tool for environmental justice is
the fact that when states issue permits pursuant to delegated programs in
lieu of the EPA under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, or RCRA, the
101
states are exempt from preparing an impact statement under NEPA. This
is often the case with permits for industrial facilities emitting large amounts
102
of toxic waste into the communities in which they are sited.
Despite these limitations, courts have upheld suits for violations of
103
NEPA’s procedural requirements. Although the ability to bring suit under
NEPA may not provide the same clear and ultimate result as litigation under
a civil rights statute would, the provisions may be used to delay projects
and constitute a bargaining chip in negotiations with agencies and private
parties that want to avoid litigation. In the absence of a right of action under
section 602 of Title VI, without the threat of a suit under NEPA, these agencies and private parties might otherwise lose the incentive to negotiate with
104
the communities.
Furthermore, public participation provisions can be useful in environ105
mental justice campaigns. By providing opportunities for public participation, environmental statutes create opportunities for community action
that is not centered on the need for a lawyer. Public hearings in connection
with the preparation of environmental impact reports present opportunities
97 See Johnson, supra note 88 (quoting Alabama ex rel. Siegelman, 911 F. 2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that permit issuance process under RCRA was a functional equivalent to the review required
under NEPA and therefore NEPA assessment was not required)).
98 Johnson, supra note 88, at 590.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 593.
101 Id. at 594-95.
102 Id. at 594.
103 For a recent example, see, e.g., Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Serv., 418
F.3d 953, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the EIS inadequate to satisfy NEPA requirements, and that Forest
Service failed to take a “hard look” at project’s true effect).
104 “The availability of a legal remedy, even when ultimately it is not pursued . . . increase[s] the
bargaining power of environmental justice advocates.” Hoffer, supra note 7, at 1008.
105 Cole, supra note 89, at 690.
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for a community to educate itself on an issue, with the help of lawyers or
106
other technical consultants.
2. Citizen suit provisions
Because environmental laws are interest-balancing and not rightsmaximizing, the remedies offered under environmental laws do not hold the
107
same promise of vindication as civil rights legislation.
Nevertheless,
108
several environmental laws contain citizen suit provisions that provide
avenues for plaintiffs where a private right of action under civil rights law
has been foreclosed. These citizen suit provisions may, as mentioned
above, undermine claims that an agency failed to comply with NEPA requirements under the functional equivalent principle.
Citizen suit provisions may, on the other hand, provide plaintiffs with
the ability to delay projects while communities pressure agencies for enforcement of their own procedural rules. These delays and the threat of
prolonged litigation may, to some extent, provide the same kind of bargaining chip for communities that litigation under civil rights legislation can,
with the additional advantage that chances of a favorable ruling, although
109
small, may still be better than in civil rights litigation.
Citizen suit provisions confer “private attorney general” status to citi110
zens providing authority to either prosecute the regulated entity for violation of an environmental law requirement or sue the public official for fail111
ure to perform nondiscretionary duties associated with that violation. Environmental law citizen suit provisions grant citizens the ability to sue on
behalf of the community at large and obtain injunctive or declaratory relief.
In contrast, non-environmental citizen suit provisions usually are actions by
112
individuals, and relief is often in the form of damages.
Citizen suits,

106

Cole, supra note 89 at 695-96.
See generally Yang, supra note 11, at 532.
108 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972; Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) 42 U.S.C. § 11046; Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §
7604; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659; Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Noise Control Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4911 and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619.
109 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 52, at 293 (describing how the low success rates of environmental
justice cases in the courts combined with the huge amount of resources communities have poured into
litigation have led to a trend of proposals of a moratorium on litigation of environmental civil rights
cases. Wilson calls the proponents of the moratorium the “abandonment camp.”). See also Suzanne
Smith, Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 250 (2002).
110 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972).
111 See Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the
Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 40-41 (1995).
112 Id. at 42-43.
107
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because they are often “fueled by the altruism of the citizen enforcer,”
suffer from lack of resources. Depending on the statute at issue, and
whether the suit is against the violating entity itself or the regulatory agency
that failed to enforce a nondiscretionary duty, different substantive and pro114
cedural limitations apply.
C. Administrative Suits and Federal Agency Review
In addition to reaching for the judiciary, environmental justice plaintiffs often have the option of filing administrative complaints, either with
115
the EPA or with state environmental protection agencies. The EPA did
virtually nothing to enforce the regulations promulgated by the EPA under
116
section 602 of Title VI until the early 1990’s. However, after the signing
117
of Executive Order 12898 requiring federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice to their missions, and requiring the Office of Civil Rights
118
(OCR) to investigate and respond to Title VI complaints. Commentators
have been unanimous in arguing that the EPA’s OCR forum, despite the
Executive Order’s promise to “make achieving environmental justice part
of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
119
populations,” does not provide any meaningful relief for complainants in
120
Title VI administrative actions.
Filing a complaint with the EPA is relatively easy, does not require a
121
lawyer, and is free. In some cases, the filing of the complaint may serve
as indication of future protracted litigation and convince a private party to
122
relocate despite having obtained a permit. When filing a complaint is not
successful in convincing a private party to withdraw an application for a
permit, administrative suits or agency reviews provide little relief. The
113

Id. at 43.
See id. (analysis of the limitations to citizen suits under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act,
CERCLA and RCRA).
115 Paras, supra note 82, at 167-68.
116 See Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental
Racism, 2 J. L. SOC’Y 5, 47 (2001).
117 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, Federal Actions
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations, signed by
President Clinton on February 11, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
118 See Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 47-48.
119 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859, supra note 114, at § 1-101.
120 See Hurwitz and Sullivan, supra note 116, at 53. See also, Paras, supra note 82, at 168; Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 200-01 (2002); and
Hoffer, supra note 7, at 1004.
121 Paras, supra note 82, at 167.
122 Id.
114
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process is not an adversarial one; complainants have no right to participate
in the investigation, are not allowed to present any evidence, and have no
123
right to information on the status of the case. Historically, only a small
percentage of complaints filed are accepted for investigation, and of those,
an even smaller proportion is actually decided on the merits, with the re124
sults almost always siding with the defendant.
125
The EPA’s Title VI Draft Revised Guidance suffers from several
debilitating limitations:
Ultimately, the Guidance sets up a mechanism for EPA to respond to
specific complaints of disparate impacts connected to a specific permit. Its understanding of the problem is derived through the lens of
the permit criteria and limited by the specific permit. . . . It is an approach that does not easily accommodate larger contexts of inequities
and historical discrimination. Yet, perniciously, it effectively allows
discrimination and inequities to be blamed on such larger patterns of
historical and societal discrimination while avoiding the tough actions
126
that would need to be taken to solve them.
These limitations make it unlikely that environmental justice plaintiffs will
find relief in the process.
D. Third Party Beneficiary Rule
Most jurisdictions have adopted a rule whereby a third party to a contract, who had no obligations under it, can nevertheless enforce it, if the
contract expresses the parties’ intention that the benefit of the promised
127
performance be conferred upon that third party. The third party beneficiary theory applied to environmental plaintiffs is based on the idea that federal-state funding agreements are, in the words of Justice Scalia “in the
128
nature of a contract.” To qualify for federal assistance from the EPA, a
prospective funding recipient (usually a state or local agency) must fill out
an application and also provide assurances that it will comply with the re129
quirements of government regulations.

123

Id. at 167-68.
Hoffer, supra note 7, at 1004.
125 Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 39 (June 27, 2000).
126 Yang, supra note 120, at 200-01.
127 Paras, supra note 82, at 169-70.
128 Id. at 172 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
349 (1997)).
129 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a)(1) (1984) states that:
Applicants for EPA assistance shall submit an assurance with their applications stating that, with
respect to their programs or activities that receive EPA assistance, they will comply with the requirements of this part. Applicants must also submit any other information that the OCR deter124
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Proponents of the third party beneficiary rule as an avenue for environmental justice litigators rely on the fact that the EPA regulations clearly
identify minorities and people of color as the intended beneficiaries of the
regulation that is made part of the consideration in the agreement between
130
the recipient and the EPA. Under the doctrine of third party beneficiary,
the rights of an intended third party beneficiary are “as enforceable as
131
though it were a party to the original contract.” Parties receiving federal
funding from the EPA have agreed to comply with EPA’s regulations, including those regulations created under section 602 of Title VI prohibiting
the implementation of programs that have discriminatory effects, even if
lacking discriminatory intent. Thus, if the regulations are violated, and facilities are not being sited in locations that avoid discriminatory impact,
third party beneficiaries of the regulation acquire a legal right to enforce the
contract.
Long before Sandoval, Justice Scalia had advocated a categorical refusal to imply federal private rights of action unless Congress had explicitly
132
indicated its intent to create such a right.
Interestingly, it was the same
Justice Scalia who also expressed a willingness to entertain the possibility
133
of a third party beneficiary action in the context of federal-state contracts.
Proponents of the use of the third party beneficiary rule in environmental justice cases see advantages for litigators in that under the rule,
plaintiffs should be entitled to the full range of contract remedies, including
specific performance or injunctive relief, expectation damages, reliance
134
Writing in 2004, one commentator suggested
damages, and restitution.
135
that litigants in cases such as South Camden and Chester might have been
more successful suing as third party beneficiaries of the agreements be136
tween EPA and the permitting agencies.
137
The Federal Circuit in Dewakuku v. Martinez suggests how a court
might answer the question whether anyone can be a third party beneficiary
of an agreement between a government agency and another party that is
entered to pursuant to a statute. In Dewakuku, a Native American woman
bought a house built by the Hopi Indian Housing Authority, an agency cremines is necessary for pre-award review. The applicant’s acceptance of EPA assistance is an acceptance of the obligation of this assurance and this part.
Id.
130

Paras, supra note 82, at 172-73.
Id. at 173 (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Africa Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 120, 139-40
(D. Del. 2002), and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2(1) (1981)).
132 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
133 Paras, supra note 82, at 172 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
134 Id. at 176-83.
135 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 32 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
136 Paras, supra note 82, at 177, 179-80.
137 Dewakuku v. Martinez, 271 F.3d 1031, 1040-42 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
131
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ated by the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Indian
138
Housing Act of 1988. HUD never contested that Dewakuku’s house was
139
not “decent, safe and sanitary” as required by the Housing Act, but argued
that Dewakuku had no right of action against HUD. One of Dewakuku’s
arguments in support of a right of action against HUD was that she was a
third party beneficiary of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) be140
tween HUD and the Hopi Indian Housing Authority (IHA). Although not
exactly an environmental justice case, the case provides insight into how a
court might analyze similar cases in environmental law.
The Federal Circuit looked at whether the contract reflected an ex141
pressly stated or an implicit intent by the parties to benefit a third party.
The court examined the language of the ACC and concluded that it did in142
dicate the parties to the contract intended to benefit the homeowners.
However, the contract also contained language rejecting third party benefi143
ciary rights to the intended beneficiaries of the contract and the Court
144
rejected Dewakuku’s claim under the third party beneficiary rule.
In a typical environmental justice case involving permitting of a hazardous facility, it is improbable that the permit itself (the contract between
the agency and the facility) will contain any indication of the intended
beneficiary of the permitting process. The third party beneficiary rule ap138 The IHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437aa-1437ff (1994), provided statutory authority for the Mutual Help
Homeownership Program (MHH) Program, a program designed to meet the homeownership needs of
low-income Indian families on Indian reservations and other Indian areas, to be carried out by HUD.
Dewakuku, 271 F.3d at 1034. Prior to the 1988 IHA, the MHHP was operated through administrative
directives and regulations rather than through any specific statutory provisions. After 1988, pursuant to
its statutory authority, the MHHP program was carried out by HUD, and HUD issued implementing
regulations for the MHH Program. Id. (citing 24 C.F.R. § 905 (1991)).
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(b)(1), 1437aa(a)(1994).
140 The ACCs’s objective is “to provide financial assistance for the development, acquisition,
operation and improvement of [public] housing projects." Dewakuku, 271 F.3d. at 1035 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1437bb(b) (1994)). HUD would not enter into an ACC unless the tribal ordinance creating the
housing authority is submitted to and approved by HUD. 24 C.F.R. § 905.109 (1990). The Indian public
housing authorities in turn were to develop, own, and operate the housing projects under HUD’s supervision and in accordance with HUD regulations. Id.
141 Id. at 1041.
142 “Section 0.2(d) of the ACC provides that the IHA shall at all times develop and operate each
Project (1) solely for the purpose of providing decent, safe, and sanitary Homes . . . within the financial
reach of Homebuyers . . . (2) in such manner as to promote serviceability, efficiency, economy, and
stability, and (3) in such manner as to achieve the economic and social well-being of the Homebuyers.
This section of the ACC does appear to express an intent to benefit homebuyers such as Dewakuku
directly.” Id.
143 “In fact, the plain language of section 14.6 of the contract is entitled ‘NO THIRD PARTY
CONTRACT RIGHTS CONFERRED,’ and states that ‘nothing in the ACC shall be construed as creating or justifying any claim against HUD by any third party.’” Id.
144 The Federal Circuit, however, remanded the case to the District Court to decide whether Dewakuku had a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because HUD’s decision was not in accordance with the law. This claim had not been examined earlier because relief had
been granted under the third party beneficiary rule. Id. at 1042.
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plies to the contract itself, so that even if the statute requiring the granting
of the permit indicates intent to benefit the population, the permit itself
probably will not. Thus, although an interesting idea, the theory may not
provide much help to environmental justice plaintiffs.
E. Addressing Residential Segregation
Residential segregation by race has been shown to be independently
associated with negative health impacts, regardless of whether the
145
neighborhood also suffers from disparate environmental impacts. The
concentration of poverty and political powerlessness increases the probabil146
ity that a community will house LULUs (locally undesirable land uses),
because decision-making groups often follow the path of least resistance.
Thus, the existence of racially segregated neighborhoods increases the
probability of environmentally racist decisions.
Unlike Title VI section 602, the federal Fair Housing Act, also known
as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (FHA), creates private rights of
action for disparate impact claims. The FHA made it illegal to discriminate
in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, nationality or
religion. The federal FHA imposes an obligation on agencies dealing with
housing to affirmatively further fair housing, including reducing racial resi147
dential segregation. Reducing residential segregation could help prevent
environmental racism merely by preventing minorities from being the majority in any given area, decreasing the probability of intentionally discriminatory placement of hazardous and undesirable facilities. Integration
should also decrease the probability that the community as a whole will
suffer from political powerlessness, as tends to be the case in racially segregated areas.
In deciding whether to find a private right of action under FHA, even
in the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent, courts have found that
The language of the Fair Housing Act is “broad and inclusive,” subject
to “generous construction,” and “complaints by private persons are the
primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.” Generally,
and particularly in a fair housing situation, the existence of a federal

145

Myron Orfield, Segregation and Environmental Justice, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. TECH. 147, 153

(2005).
146

Id.
The relevant part of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(a)) provides in part that “it shall be
unlawful . . . to . . . make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”
147
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statutory right implies the existence of all measures necessary and ap148
propriate to protect federal rights and implement federal policies.
The 7th Circuit in Arlington Heights argued that although the Supreme
Court had taken a narrow view of the Equal Protection in Washington v.
Davis, it had left open the possibility of a right of action under other stat149
utes.
The promise of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arlington Heights,
however, has not necessarily materialized in other jurisdictions. It appears
that courts may be choosing to follow Justice Scalia’s parsimonious approach to implied rights in Sandoval, despite the Supreme Court’s own admission in Washington v. Davis that other statutes may permit a right of
action in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut, for example, has followed this narrow approach in a
recent housing discrimination case pursued under Title VIII:
An agency’s obligation under 42 U.S.C.S. § 3608(d) affirmatively to
further the purposes of the fair housing statutes does not create an unambiguous right vested in individual plaintiffs. The statutory language
is not a directive to benefit the public generally with respect to a specific right, as in “all persons shall have the right to fair housing,” nor
is it a prohibition on certain acts against the public, as in “no person
shall be denied access to fair housing by housing agencies.” Rather, §
3608(d) is directed at executive departments and agencies regarding
the administration of their programs and activities. This administrative focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual plaintiffs and, therefore, does not confer the sort of individual entitlement
150
that is enforceable under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.
Furthermore, Title VIII is very specifically tied to housing law and
151
claims must be connected to housing concerns. Since Title VIII “is designed to work when actual harm can be shown to a particular piece of
property” making the success of a claim dependent of the existence of a full
record showing damage to a particular property, the Fair Housing Act can
not provide the tool that environmental justice advocates need.

148 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 1980)
(internal citations omitted).
149 Metrop. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1977).
150 Asylum Hill Problem Solving and Revitalization Ass’n v. King, 890 A.2d 522, 539 (Conn.
2006).
151 Wilson, supra note 52, at 299.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Another alternative is legislative reform; Congress could amend civil
rights statutes and explicitly provide for a private right of action for federally funded action that is shown to have a racially discriminatory impact,
regardless of intent. The inability of civil rights litigation to achieve its
goal in courts may be a strong indication that Congressional action to in152
clude “rights-creating language” in Civil Rights legislation is sorely
153
needed. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the impact of the intent requirement in the context the federal Fair Housing Act underscores the inconsistency between the denial of a right of action absent proof of intent,
and the broad goals of civil rights legislation:
Conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating the national commitment “to replace the
ghettos 'by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’” . . . Moreover, a requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent before relief can be granted under the statute is often a burden that is impossible to satisfy. “Intent, motive, and purpose are elusive subjective
concepts,” and attempts to discern the intent of an entity such as a
municipality are at best problematic. A strict focus on intent permits
racial discrimination to go unpunished in the absence of evidence of
overt bigotry. As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable, evidence of intent has become harder to find. But this does
not mean that racial discrimination has disappeared. We cannot agree
that Congress in enacting the Fair Housing Act intended to permit
municipalities to systematically deprive minorities of housing oppor154
tunities simply because those municipalities act discreetly.
What the Seventh Circuit recognized is that more often than not, the
impact is the only concrete evidence of intent. While it is theoretically possible that a policy or siting decision unintentionally results in disparate impact, in reality there is a very strong probability that the decision contained
an intentional element that was hidden, or rationalized, under a host of
155
technical information.
There are strong reasons to submerge the discriminatory intent, not the least of them the long-standing constitutional
proscription of intentional discrimination. The court’s reaction to the cir152 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 284 n.3 (2002) (quoting Sandoval and expanding it to also preclude a right of action for regulations
created through non-rights creating statutes such as Title VI § 602 through 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
153 Prior attempts to amend the Constitution to include the right to a healthy and healthful environment have failed. See Popovic, supra note 5, at 346.
154 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1289-90 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
155 Yang, supra note 11, at 539

280

FIU Law Review

[4:255
156

cumstantial evidence of intent in South Camden III indicates that the current standard of proof for discriminatory intent hovers around “beyond a
157
The absence of evidence of discriminatory intent—
reasonable doubt.”
other than the impact itself—should not be taken as evidence of the absence
158
of such intent. Rather, in light of the complexity of the regulatory process, and the fact that the “actor” is an institution to which an attribution of
159
intent is problematic, evidence of impact should be, if not equated with
intent, at least considered an important factor under consideration.
The dichotomy between statutes where the language focuses on the individual, requiring proof of intentional discrimination, and statutes that
focus on the agency is court-created. When the Supreme Court decided Lau
160
v. Nichols, this dichotomy simply did not exist. In Lau, decided pursuant
to section 602 of Title VI, there was no suggestion that simply because the
language referred to the agency instead of to the individual, the statute did
not create an enforceable right. The Court understood that the statute made
161
clear who it was meant to benefit. Lau followed traditional canons of
statutory interpretation, by considering the statute as a whole. In contrast,
decisions based on Sandoval look at different sections of the same Act as if
they were created for totally unrelated purposes.
If Congress is unwilling to create new rights of action under civil
rights legislation, it can, alternatively, shift the burden of proof to the
agency. The agency is the party who holds the evidence on the decisionmaking process. Congress could create a rebuttable presumption that a dis162
criminatory intent was present where plaintiffs are able to produce statis163
tical evidence of discriminate impact. Shifting the burden does not elimi-

156 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 01-702, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45765 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
157 Wilson, supra note 52, at 311.
158 “[T]he Court has spent too much time attempting to trace discriminatory results to specific
bigoted actors or specific bigoted acts, without acknowledging the possibility that discriminatory intent
may very well be present in the absence of such evidence.” Id.
159 Yang, supra note 11, at 533.
160 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
161 But see Alexander, supra note 149, at 289.
162 Edward Boyle suggested that once plaintiffs show a significant disparate impact on suspect
classes the burden should be shifted to defendants to show that “the interests [of the suspect class] were
Boyle, supra note 60, at 981. Another burden shifting proposal involves plaintiffs’ show of discriminatory impact shifting the burden to defendants having to show the decision is an environmental necessity,
then the plaintiff has the burden of showing existence of alternative sites, which shifts the burden back
to defendant to show the site chosen was necessary to safely dispose of hazardous wastes. See Rachel
Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 416-17 (1991).
163 Demanding statistically significant evidence can also create an unreasonable burden for plaintiffs. Even if the requirement does not rise to the level of the perfect correlation found in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (where the evidence showed that no Chinese applicant received a laundry
permit and every single white applicant received one), in cases of hazardous facilities, more often than
not, the numbers will not be large enough to obtain statistically significant correlations between social or
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nate the intent requirement; it merely places the burden on the party controlling the evidence once the moving party brings in evidence of disparate
impact. A similar problem occurs under environmental laws, where the burden of proving harm is placed on the community opposing the placement of
164
a facility, instead of on the polluting actor or permitting agency.
V. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The field of environmental human rights law is at the intersection of
165
human rights and environmental law.
Under international human rights
laws, it is well established that the right to a safe physical environment is a
fundamental human right in equal footing with other fundamental human
rights. This principle dates back to the First Principle in the Stockholm Declaration developed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which states that
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
166
and improve the environment for present and future generations.
The notion that people have the right to live in an environment that allows them to be healthy and productive was reinforced in 1992 with the Rio
167
Declaration, and then expanded in the Draft Declaration of Principles on
Human Rights and the Environment from 1994, which states that: “[a]ll
persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions
168
and decisions that affect the environment.”
These Declarations drafted in the course of international conferences
may, however, be considered precatory or aspirational and not imposing
binding obligations on countries attending the conference. On the other
hand, international treaties signed and ratified by the United States ac-

racial groups and the location of the facility. See Suzanne Smith, Current Treatment of Environmental
Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 232 (2002).
164 See Alma Lowry, Achieving Justice: The Case for Legislative Reform, 20 T.M. COOLEY L.REV.
335, 353 (2003) (arguing that in environmental law rights are vested in the wrong party, “the system
places the burden of proving harm on the community, the party with the least access to information and
technical expertise, rather than on the polluting industry”).
165 Most documents on environmental human rights acknowledge the connection between the
environment and the ability to enjoy other fundamental human rights: “environmental damage can have
potentially negative effects on the enjoyment of some human rights.” Comm’n on Human Rights Res.
2003/71, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRC/RES/71 (Apr. 25, 2003). See also Popovic, supra note 5, at 348.
166 Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden, June 5-16, 1972, Final Declaration, Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1973).
167 Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration On Environment And Development, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
168 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Principle 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4.Sub.2/1994/9 (May 16, 1994) (prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini).
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knowledging environmental rights as fundamental human rights, can be
seen as imposing certain obligations on the country. Unlike civil rights laws
in the United States, the language of international human rights laws can
not be interpreted as being limited to proscribing only intentional discrimi169
Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All
nation.
170
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), for instance, state parties are
required to “take effective measures to review governmental, national and
local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws or regulations
which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination
171
wherever it exists.” Even clearer is the proscription against “all forms” of
racial discrimination. One would be hard pressed to find a justification to
interpret “all forms of discrimination” as prohibiting only overtly intentional discrimination. Furthermore, the CERD requires “the provision of an
impartial forum to address individual claims and provide a responsive rem172
edy when a claim prevails” clearly indicating the existence of a private
right of action.
173
The United States has signed and ratified the CERD, and Article VI
of the United States Constitution states that “ . . . Treaties made . . . under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
174
Land.”
Thus, denial of a right of action based on lack of proof of discriminatory intent in environmental justice cases and the refusal to accept
evidence of discriminatory impact may constitute a violation of international obligations under the CERD. Plaintiffs attempting to state a claim
under CERD, however, will probably be denied a right of action because
ratification of the CERD—like that of the two other human rights treaties
175
ratified by the United States —was conditional, subject to “reservations,

169

See Popovic, supra note 5, at 353, n.64.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 600 U.N.T.S. 195.
171 Id. at Art. 2(1)(c)(emphasis added).
172 Timothy Kuhner, Human Rights Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying Bases,
And Pathways for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 425-26 (2003).
173 The United States signed the CERD on September 28, 1966 and ratified it on October 21, 1994.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/2.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
174 U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 1, Cl.2: “. . . and all the Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
175 The United States has ratified only three treaties that have fundamental human rights components: the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). However, “[t]he treaties to which the United States is a party that contain human rights elements either expressly or by implication are not self-executing.” Steven M. Schneebaum, Human Rights in the United
States Courts: The Role of Lawyers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (1998). Thus, “[t]he United
States, a nation with courts capable of prosecuting government officials for violations of international
law, as well as a constitution that makes treaties the law of the land, has intentionally limited the effects
170
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176

understandings and declarations” that classify the CERD as non-self177
executing. Furthermore, these reservations include “forced conformity”
provisions that restrict the interpretation of key terms in international trea178
ties to their constitutional definition. In this way, the United States has
prevented ratification of international treaties and conventions from imposing any judicial obligations beyond those already provided for in domestic
179
law.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the CERD can provide a
private right of action against state or federal executive agencies. Lower
courts, however, have agreed that “the United States . . . clarified that the
ICCPR and the CERD did not create a private right of action enforceable in
180
U.S. courts.”
Despite the fact that international treaties containing environmental
rights may not, even after ratification, be enforceable in domestic courts,
these treaties and the case law created under them in foreign courts may
still have an impact in environmental justice cases. The morsel of hope can
181
be found in Roper v. Simmons where the Supreme Court recognized that
although not controlling, “the opinion of the world community” can provide
182
“respected and significant confirmation” for the court’s conclusion that a
consensus against the juvenile death penalty existed. In Roper, the Court
relied on state law provisions or interpretations and state practices to interpret the Eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual pun183
ishment.
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper, litigation of environmental justice cases in states that have adopted strong SEPAs, particularly those that have attempted to incorporate a substantive element to their

of H[uman] R[ights] T[reatie]s in its territory.” Kuhner, supra note 172, at 419 (internal citations omitted).
176 See, e.g., Kuhner , supra note 172, at 419. See also U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the CERD, U.S. S. RES. 140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (June 24, 1994).
177 The Supreme Court has long ago subscribed to a dualist approach to international treaties
dividing international treaties into self-executing and non-self-executing. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley,
International Delegations, The Structural Constitution and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557,
1596 (2003). Under this dualist approach, the legislature must take action, or “execute” a treaty before it
becomes binding on a domestic court. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
178 Forced conformity provisions require that “a given provision or phrase must be interpreted
identically to constitutional provisions covering similar topics.” Kuhner, supra note 172, at 429.
179 Id. at 426.
180 United States v. Perez, No. 3-02, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7500, 52-53 (D. Conn. Apr. 29, 2004)
(citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 163 (2d Cir. 2003)). The same language is
quoted in Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00-8586, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, 23-24 (S.D.N.Y. June 14,
2004) and again adopted by the court in Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
181 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
182 Id. at 578.
183 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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184

environmental statutes may help create the kind of “consensus” on environmental justice as a fundamental right that a Supreme Court may one day,
combine with international law and rely upon.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are major roadblocks for plaintiffs aiming to prevent
185
environmental injustice through civil rights litigation. These major difficulties include the obstacles posed by an arbitrary and impossibly high burden of proof for showing intentional discrimination, the Sandoval ban to a
186
private right of action under section 602, and the denial of a right of action to enforce anti-discriminatory legislation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
unless the statute itself explicitly creates the right of action. There seems to
be general agreement that Title VI regulations have been effectively
187
stripped of both an implied right of action by Sandoval and enforceable
188
rights under § 1983 in South Camden.
More than in other issues such as housing, employment, education, or
voting, the focus on the intent requirement in environmental justice cases
has severely undermined the effectiveness of civil rights legislation. The
decision-making process in environmental cases, such as siting of hazardous facilities, is more complex than decisions in employment or education,
involving a host of variables such as access to the site and other more technical factors that increase the deference courts give to agency decisionmakers.
None of the litigation approaches examined above has met with the
level of success that civil rights litigation was able to achieve in the courts
189
in other contexts.
Some of the approaches involving more intense grass-

184 See Johnson, supra note 88, n.135 (mentioning which states have stricter requirements than
NEPA). See also Philip Weinberg, It’s Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 111
(1994)(listing cases where courts have struck down project approvals for government failure to mitigate
environmental impacts).
185 Even before the Sandoval decision, there was already recognition that “the difficulty in proving
racial animus, the lack of sufficient statistical analysis to resolve the ‘chicken or egg’ conundrum, and
the multi-faceted nature of factors leading to disproportionate siting practices all but preclude effective
use of traditional civil rights statutes to resolve what is, in reality, both a race-influenced and classinfluenced dilemma.” Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 540.(1997). See also Daniel Madrid,
Can Environmental Justice Movement Survive Without Title VI of the Civil Rights Act? 14 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 123, 149 (2003), concluding that political action by a group of citizens sparked by the South Camden litigation may be an alternative avenue to litigation through Title VI.
186 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
187 Id.
188 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 01-702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45765 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
189 Civil rights legislation has not delivered to environmental justice plaintiffs anything comparable to the effect of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for example. It is true that even
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roots community activism may hold more promise than the more traditional
190
“lawyer-centered” approaches. Community-based approaches such as
participatory models and grassroots activism have the additional advantage
of empowering communities that may have actually been disempowered by
191
the need to rely on lawyers and other professionals to litigate their cases.
This empowerment and increased participation in public processes may
impact the community’s ability to deal with other civil rights issues beyond
the environmental justice context. It remains to be seen, however, whether
the removal of the threat of litigation might undermine the power of com192
munity activism, as some commentators suggest.
Legislative reform could definitely help environmental justice plaintiffs by either changing the standard for a showing of discriminatory intent,
or by using a burden shifting approach when discriminatory impact is
shown, as is the case under Title IX legislation, for example. Barring Congressional action changing legislation, the search for alternative approaches
to civil rights litigation will continue.
There are strong arguments for continuing to pursue civil rights litigation: it has an educational role for the community and others who hear
about the litigation, it gives the issue media attention, and it can serve as an
obstructive device that may deter parties from building in places where they
193
face strong community objections. Although litigation may not appear to
be cost-effective on a “win-lose” accountability system, there are other advantages to litigation that may not be so clear-cut. In many cases, it is the
“leverage accorded by enhanced access to courts, rather than the actual litigation, that will serve to correct environmental inequities by removing the
economic and political incentives that drive environmental hazards to these
194
communities.” Litigation under state environmental laws, particularly in
states with substantive elements in their SEPAs should be explored as a way
to build “consensus” over environmental issues. Finally, the idea of a
strong attack on the intent requirement using empirical data and forcing a
questioning of the racist assumptions that permeate the administration of
justice may be worth exploring.

cases considered extremely successful, like Brown, can not claim to have changed the reality of educational segregation on the ground as much as they have changed the politics of education.
190 Cole, supra note 89, at 710.
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., Hoffer, supra note 7, at 1008 (arguing that “the availability of a legal remedy—even
when it ultimately is not pursued—has without doubt, increased the bargaining power of environmental
justice advocates”).
193 Wilson, supra note 52 at 320-21.
194 Gauna, supra note 111, at 87.

